What do the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and the Produce Section Have in Common?

Okay, I must warn you, O imaginary readership, for this may be my most "mohem" post yet... so bear with me. Earlier today, I attended a panel discussion at the Woodrow Wilson Center entitled, “Breakthrough or Breakdown: The Obama Administration and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” and I was vaguely uplifted by the panelists’ views on the Arab-Israeli peace initiative. According to Aaron David Miller, a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center, “there is nothing wrong with a bold and ambitions agenda,” when it comes to Arab-Israeli peace; what is wrong, however, is the attempt to mobilize this agenda with illusions about the conditions and costs of a fair, lasting agreement. Optimistic about the prospects of peace and the United States’ ability to foster such an agreement, Miller invited Ghaith Al-Omari and Shai Feldman to discuss the political concerns and objectives that Abbas and Netanyahu will bring to the table during their upcoming visits to Washington—both of which, he argued, could potentially mark either a “breakthrough or a breakdown” in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

All three panelists agreed that the domestic conditions for an Palestinian-Israeli agreement are not yet ripe, as each political entity must achieve a certain degree of consensus among their respective leaders before a two-state solution could come to fruition. Ghaith Al-Omari, Advocacy Director of the American Task Force on Palestine and former adviser to President Mahmoud Abbas, discussed several obstacles that the Palestinians face on the domestic front-- mainly the discord between Fatah and Hamas, Fatah’s mistrust of Salam Fayyad in his efforts to create a nonpartisan security apparatus, and internal fragmentation within the Fatah party itself. While the prospects of a unity government are grim, Al-Omari was confident that a consensus would be possible if the Palestinian Authority could disassociate itself with discredited members of the PLO, while being careful not to legitimize Hamas by holding negotiations without preconditions.

Similarly, Shai Feldman—Judith and Sidney Swartz Director at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University—discussed the varying views on the Israeli side, highlighting the different approaches of Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minister Lieberman. In the absence of a Palestinian unity, Netanyahu favors a “bottom-up” approach of lifting barriers to ease the flow of people and economic activity; meanwhile, Lieberman supports a two-state solution, and Barak is willing to engage with Gaza in order to remove blockades and put an end to rocket attacks. Feldman argued that the eventual amalgamation of agendas would by no means yield a major Sadat-style breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli process. Rather, the window has been opened slightly, and just enough for the process to accelerate in a meaningful direction.

While both Al-Omari and Feldman were concerned with the particular domestic conditions that affect the Palestinian-Israeli issue, they went on to treat the issue within the larger context of the Israeli-Arab peace process. While various issues regarding Syria, Israel, Iran, and Palestine must be treated in strategic conjunction with one another, argued Miller, Israel could only begin to break out of its regional isolation if it dealt with the Palestinian issue first.

Feldman stressed the need for an operationalized Arab-Israeli peace initiative that includes clear benchmarks and incentives for Israeli compliance with the braided issues of Palestine, Syria, and Iran. Yet, fully acknowledging the limitations of U.S. incentives alone, both Feldman and Al-Omari envisioned different triggers for this comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement: Feldman argued that Arab leaders must rise to the challenge of setting these concrete goals and agree to create material incentives for Israeli cooperation; Al-Omari argued that a system of goals and rewards among Israel and the Arab nations could only emerge if the quality of life in Gaza improves and if the U.S. Congress and the Jewish mainstream undergo a significant shift in their discourse.

Echoing this imperative to materialize the incentives for cooperation, Miller stressed the importance of abandoning any illusions about the costs of the peace process. Rather than trying to reach an agreement "on the cheap," Arab and Israeli leaders must be honest about how much time, patience, and sacrifice a meaningful agreement will require; in turn, the U.S. must be honest about the implications of its “special” relationship with Israel, as America cannot be a credible and effective mediator if this exclusivity continues.

With his confidence in diplomacy and resolute departure from the previous administration’s approach, Barack Obama has infused the Arab-Israeli peace process with an ethic of hope. Miller suggests three possible scenarios that the U.S. could pursue: first, the “cautious approach,” in which the U.S. assumes that Israel will take no steps towards peace until the U.S. deals with Iran; the “smart approach,” which prioritizes the ostensibly more attainable Israeli-Syrian agreement over the seemingly unsolvable Israeli-Palestinian issue; and the “bold approach,” which locates the U.S. at the crux of the peace process as well as the fate of Jerusalem, borders, refugees, security, and the role of Arab neighbors in fostering a comprehensive agreement.

What I found especially interesting about this two-hour discussion was the frequency with which each panelist employed produce-related analogies to describe the Arab-Israeli peace initiative: Each speaker believed that the domestic conditions in Israel and Palestine were not yet ripe for a fair and enduring agreement; the “low-hanging fruit” in Israeli foreign policy is dealing with Syria and the Golan Heights first, rather than tackling the Palestinian issue; Feldman described Lieberman, Barak, and Netanyahu as three different "fruits" in the blender of policymaking that just may, before talks with the US commence, create a "smoothie" of consensus (this actually got a lot of laughs from the audience).

I feel like this fruit/ agricultural rhetoric is intimately tied to the sense of urgency with which an Arab-Israeli agreement is always posited (and appropriately so)—"the time is ripe;" the talks are premature; the process is in a state of decay. While the Obama administration has forged a new window of opportunity with the issue (especially in the aftermath of Gaza), the clock has by no means stopped entirely. The US must act quickly to ensure commitment on both sides, paying close attention to the “degrees of ripeness” that circumscribe the process itself... lest the prospect of peace become the stuff of political compost (too far?).

In short, if we’re going to cultivate a meaningful and lasting Arab-Israeli agreement under the leadership of the new administration, the domestic scene must be ripe, Arab and Israeli leaders must be honest and committed, clear benchmarks must be established...and everyone is going to have to grow a pair of grapes.