Monday, June 8, 2009
Where's Waldo: Gulf Edition
SPOTTED: Ahmadinejad at the GCC Meeting
While Ahmadinejad has attended GCC meetings in the past, the source speculates that this may be some kind of dirty election trick.
Sunday, June 7, 2009
Lebanese Elections: Yahsalam!
The Lebanese Opposition's secret weapon: FPM Femme fatales?
Je suis un poco annoyed. Thanks to Yaman for the pic :)
Friday, June 5, 2009
Baby Steps
Like the rest of the entire universe, I too happened to catch the speech Obama so eloquently delivered to the “Muslim world” in Cairo. Rather than offer a play by play of Obama’s points and infusing them with my own unique, groundbreaking interpretations (something I’d rather leave to the likes of Stephen Walt or Marc Lynch), I thought I would just mention one thing in particular that resonated with me (experts analyze; amateurs muse).
In the context of the Arab-Israeli peace initiative, Obama made a distinction between the politics that saturate overt public statements versus those that are formed and harbored with implicit understanding of what reality requires of leaders:
This message is pretty straightforward: both parties recognize that neither can “have it all,” and rigidity has no place in a situation that inherently seeks compromise. But this got me thinking about the varying weight and credibility of the statements leaders (American, Arab, or Israeli) make in private versus those made in public. While conversations behind closed doors find legitimacy in the (ostensible) candidness and sincerity that privacy lends, public statements are more deliberate and bear the weight of accountability to the international community. Clearly, there is room for both to fall short, as both have time and time again: A leader’s off-the-record* statement is as good as unmade, and one (wo)man’s grand oration is another’s empty PR.
Obama implies that “off the record” politics tend to more adequately reflect reality, while the polemics of the public realm are inadequate but will inevitably dominate the discourse. If there’s anything that all public statements about the Arab-Israeli peace initiative have in common, it’s failing to deliver. So what, I ask, is the mechanism for credibility in this instance? Compromise is clearly in order, but is the mere public recognition of its necessity enough to bridge the honesty gap between public and private diplomacy? Moreover, it is the parameters of compromise, rather than the question of its necessity, that presents the biggest obstacle to reaching a lasting, equitable agreement, no? Yes, I know. We must first agree to compromise before we can hammer out the gritty-nitties. Baby steps.
*The issue of the settlement freeze most clearly demonstrates the danger of the "private" agreement; while "not everything is written down," how can you possibly claim to formulate consistent policy around implicit "understandings?" Do winks and knowing looks suffice?
In the context of the Arab-Israeli peace initiative, Obama made a distinction between the politics that saturate overt public statements versus those that are formed and harbored with implicit understanding of what reality requires of leaders:
“America will align our policies with those who pursue peace and say in public what we say in private to Israelis and Palestinians and Arabs. We cannot impose peace. But privately, many Muslims recognize that Israel will not go away. Likewise, many Israelis recognize the need for a Palestinian state. It is time for us to act on what everyone knows to be true.”
Obama implies that “off the record” politics tend to more adequately reflect reality, while the polemics of the public realm are inadequate but will inevitably dominate the discourse. If there’s anything that all public statements about the Arab-Israeli peace initiative have in common, it’s failing to deliver. So what, I ask, is the mechanism for credibility in this instance? Compromise is clearly in order, but is the mere public recognition of its necessity enough to bridge the honesty gap between public and private diplomacy? Moreover, it is the parameters of compromise, rather than the question of its necessity, that presents the biggest obstacle to reaching a lasting, equitable agreement, no? Yes, I know. We must first agree to compromise before we can hammer out the gritty-nitties. Baby steps.
*The issue of the settlement freeze most clearly demonstrates the danger of the "private" agreement; while "not everything is written down," how can you possibly claim to formulate consistent policy around implicit "understandings?" Do winks and knowing looks suffice?
Monday, June 1, 2009
On a Scale of One to Corrupt... Yemen: She is Corrupt.
So my friend Murray is going to Yemen for an indefinite period of time-- and for reasons that are unclear to me or anyone else in his family. Nevertheless, he's gotta be prepared. He's got to expect the unexpected. And he's gotta pack light. (Traversing those precipitous mountainside villages is tough and not conducive to heavy bags-- even if you do happen to have wheels on your luggage.) We're actually all pretty worried about him, because he's never been to the Middle East and has only a 9th grade education. So to help Murray out, Lindsey, Andy, and I did a bit of research, scouring primary sources and a bunch of USAID and UN reports to introduce him to the culture and help him navigate society.
Yemeni society is characterized by an intoxicating blend of fragmented loyalties, tension between governmental and tribal authorities, and various inconsistent mechanisms for dispute resolution; it's salted and peppered with bribery and patronage, marinated in seven mouthwatering herbs and spices, and then deep-fried.
In this first installment of advice, I'll address how Murray will inevitably have to secure government cooperation for his various projects there; he’ll have to either find someone in the system to advocate his position or go straight to the top of the food chain with his requests.
Getting anything done through government channels can be extremely difficult and time consuming in Yemen. For the past three decades, political power in Yemen has been tightly controlled by President Saleh. In order to maintain its grip over the country, the Saleh regime buys loyalty and alliances, funded entirely by oil revenues. These alliances —include a wide range of interest groups such as tribes, security services, political parties, and religious groups. The President must keep these interest groups satisfied in order to maintain stability and his rule. President Saleh’s sons are active in the small inner circle of decision-making and politics, but it is unclear who will have the political acumen to balance the system after President Saleh.
Corruption is widespread, and government institutions are extremely weak, especially outside of the capital city. There is little transparency or accountability, and government officials and judges aren’t always qualified and can be easily bribed. In order to maintain control for himself and his tribe, the Saleh regime has tried to deny power to local governments in the south. Regional governors, appointed by Saleh, are all northerners from tribes allied with the President Sanhan tribe. Tribes and the military-security apparatus receive the most benefit from Yemen’s elaborate patronage network. Tribes receive money directly from the government, which is included in the national budget. On top of that, the government’s Department of Tribal grants significant sheikhs (some 4,000-5,000 in total) a monthly salary as well as semiofficial status as legal officers. Northern tribes have benefitted most from this system.
Once the tribal leaders receive the payments it is at their discretion to distribute cash among their tribesman and family members, which is based on internal tribal hierarchies and family connections. Military elites also benefit from the patronage system. The government allocates budgets to important military officials based on the number of soldiers under their command. So the officers tend to be liberal when reporting numbers of men with the use of “ghost soldiers,” who can be entirely fictitious or actual people who just don’t report for duty.
A second form of patronage payoffs to military elites is through the Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO). Run by active duty military officers, YECO controls large pieces of land, primarily in the old South Yemen, and is prone to corruption. It is not uncommon for the military, either directly or through YECO, to claim occupied land for military use and then sell it to developers for private gain.
The government patronage network spreads throughout the government bureaucracy and “employs” thousands of Yemenis civil servants, many of whom collect salaries without performing any duties. The government also buys friends in Yemen’s business families. Support and loyalty is often rewarded with lucrative business contracts. Moreover, Yemeni society is marked by the absence of a strong middle class, which then makes the tribes “the dominant power brokers in Yemen because they’re the ones with the money. They directly challenge the state for authority and compete with it for the loyalty of the public at the local level.
According to the UNDP office in Yemen, 15.7 percent of the population lives on less than US$1 a day and 45.2 percent live on less than US$2 a day. Which is why it doesn’t take much to pay people off. It is clear that the majority of the wealth that the government distributes is funneled directly into this patronage network. This means that power is concentrated at the center.
This concludes Part 1 of our guide to Yemen. You're welcome in advance, Murray.
Yemeni society is characterized by an intoxicating blend of fragmented loyalties, tension between governmental and tribal authorities, and various inconsistent mechanisms for dispute resolution; it's salted and peppered with bribery and patronage, marinated in seven mouthwatering herbs and spices, and then deep-fried.
In this first installment of advice, I'll address how Murray will inevitably have to secure government cooperation for his various projects there; he’ll have to either find someone in the system to advocate his position or go straight to the top of the food chain with his requests.
Getting anything done through government channels can be extremely difficult and time consuming in Yemen. For the past three decades, political power in Yemen has been tightly controlled by President Saleh. In order to maintain its grip over the country, the Saleh regime buys loyalty and alliances, funded entirely by oil revenues. These alliances —include a wide range of interest groups such as tribes, security services, political parties, and religious groups. The President must keep these interest groups satisfied in order to maintain stability and his rule. President Saleh’s sons are active in the small inner circle of decision-making and politics, but it is unclear who will have the political acumen to balance the system after President Saleh.
Corruption is widespread, and government institutions are extremely weak, especially outside of the capital city. There is little transparency or accountability, and government officials and judges aren’t always qualified and can be easily bribed. In order to maintain control for himself and his tribe, the Saleh regime has tried to deny power to local governments in the south. Regional governors, appointed by Saleh, are all northerners from tribes allied with the President Sanhan tribe. Tribes and the military-security apparatus receive the most benefit from Yemen’s elaborate patronage network. Tribes receive money directly from the government, which is included in the national budget. On top of that, the government’s Department of Tribal grants significant sheikhs (some 4,000-5,000 in total) a monthly salary as well as semiofficial status as legal officers. Northern tribes have benefitted most from this system.
Once the tribal leaders receive the payments it is at their discretion to distribute cash among their tribesman and family members, which is based on internal tribal hierarchies and family connections. Military elites also benefit from the patronage system. The government allocates budgets to important military officials based on the number of soldiers under their command. So the officers tend to be liberal when reporting numbers of men with the use of “ghost soldiers,” who can be entirely fictitious or actual people who just don’t report for duty.
A second form of patronage payoffs to military elites is through the Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO). Run by active duty military officers, YECO controls large pieces of land, primarily in the old South Yemen, and is prone to corruption. It is not uncommon for the military, either directly or through YECO, to claim occupied land for military use and then sell it to developers for private gain.
The government patronage network spreads throughout the government bureaucracy and “employs” thousands of Yemenis civil servants, many of whom collect salaries without performing any duties. The government also buys friends in Yemen’s business families. Support and loyalty is often rewarded with lucrative business contracts. Moreover, Yemeni society is marked by the absence of a strong middle class, which then makes the tribes “the dominant power brokers in Yemen because they’re the ones with the money. They directly challenge the state for authority and compete with it for the loyalty of the public at the local level.
According to the UNDP office in Yemen, 15.7 percent of the population lives on less than US$1 a day and 45.2 percent live on less than US$2 a day. Which is why it doesn’t take much to pay people off. It is clear that the majority of the wealth that the government distributes is funneled directly into this patronage network. This means that power is concentrated at the center.
This concludes Part 1 of our guide to Yemen. You're welcome in advance, Murray.
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