Monday, June 8, 2009
Where's Waldo: Gulf Edition
SPOTTED: Ahmadinejad at the GCC Meeting
While Ahmadinejad has attended GCC meetings in the past, the source speculates that this may be some kind of dirty election trick.
Sunday, June 7, 2009
Lebanese Elections: Yahsalam!
The Lebanese Opposition's secret weapon: FPM Femme fatales?
Je suis un poco annoyed. Thanks to Yaman for the pic :)
Friday, June 5, 2009
Baby Steps
Like the rest of the entire universe, I too happened to catch the speech Obama so eloquently delivered to the “Muslim world” in Cairo. Rather than offer a play by play of Obama’s points and infusing them with my own unique, groundbreaking interpretations (something I’d rather leave to the likes of Stephen Walt or Marc Lynch), I thought I would just mention one thing in particular that resonated with me (experts analyze; amateurs muse).
In the context of the Arab-Israeli peace initiative, Obama made a distinction between the politics that saturate overt public statements versus those that are formed and harbored with implicit understanding of what reality requires of leaders:
This message is pretty straightforward: both parties recognize that neither can “have it all,” and rigidity has no place in a situation that inherently seeks compromise. But this got me thinking about the varying weight and credibility of the statements leaders (American, Arab, or Israeli) make in private versus those made in public. While conversations behind closed doors find legitimacy in the (ostensible) candidness and sincerity that privacy lends, public statements are more deliberate and bear the weight of accountability to the international community. Clearly, there is room for both to fall short, as both have time and time again: A leader’s off-the-record* statement is as good as unmade, and one (wo)man’s grand oration is another’s empty PR.
Obama implies that “off the record” politics tend to more adequately reflect reality, while the polemics of the public realm are inadequate but will inevitably dominate the discourse. If there’s anything that all public statements about the Arab-Israeli peace initiative have in common, it’s failing to deliver. So what, I ask, is the mechanism for credibility in this instance? Compromise is clearly in order, but is the mere public recognition of its necessity enough to bridge the honesty gap between public and private diplomacy? Moreover, it is the parameters of compromise, rather than the question of its necessity, that presents the biggest obstacle to reaching a lasting, equitable agreement, no? Yes, I know. We must first agree to compromise before we can hammer out the gritty-nitties. Baby steps.
*The issue of the settlement freeze most clearly demonstrates the danger of the "private" agreement; while "not everything is written down," how can you possibly claim to formulate consistent policy around implicit "understandings?" Do winks and knowing looks suffice?
In the context of the Arab-Israeli peace initiative, Obama made a distinction between the politics that saturate overt public statements versus those that are formed and harbored with implicit understanding of what reality requires of leaders:
“America will align our policies with those who pursue peace and say in public what we say in private to Israelis and Palestinians and Arabs. We cannot impose peace. But privately, many Muslims recognize that Israel will not go away. Likewise, many Israelis recognize the need for a Palestinian state. It is time for us to act on what everyone knows to be true.”
Obama implies that “off the record” politics tend to more adequately reflect reality, while the polemics of the public realm are inadequate but will inevitably dominate the discourse. If there’s anything that all public statements about the Arab-Israeli peace initiative have in common, it’s failing to deliver. So what, I ask, is the mechanism for credibility in this instance? Compromise is clearly in order, but is the mere public recognition of its necessity enough to bridge the honesty gap between public and private diplomacy? Moreover, it is the parameters of compromise, rather than the question of its necessity, that presents the biggest obstacle to reaching a lasting, equitable agreement, no? Yes, I know. We must first agree to compromise before we can hammer out the gritty-nitties. Baby steps.
*The issue of the settlement freeze most clearly demonstrates the danger of the "private" agreement; while "not everything is written down," how can you possibly claim to formulate consistent policy around implicit "understandings?" Do winks and knowing looks suffice?
Monday, June 1, 2009
On a Scale of One to Corrupt... Yemen: She is Corrupt.
So my friend Murray is going to Yemen for an indefinite period of time-- and for reasons that are unclear to me or anyone else in his family. Nevertheless, he's gotta be prepared. He's got to expect the unexpected. And he's gotta pack light. (Traversing those precipitous mountainside villages is tough and not conducive to heavy bags-- even if you do happen to have wheels on your luggage.) We're actually all pretty worried about him, because he's never been to the Middle East and has only a 9th grade education. So to help Murray out, Lindsey, Andy, and I did a bit of research, scouring primary sources and a bunch of USAID and UN reports to introduce him to the culture and help him navigate society.
Yemeni society is characterized by an intoxicating blend of fragmented loyalties, tension between governmental and tribal authorities, and various inconsistent mechanisms for dispute resolution; it's salted and peppered with bribery and patronage, marinated in seven mouthwatering herbs and spices, and then deep-fried.
In this first installment of advice, I'll address how Murray will inevitably have to secure government cooperation for his various projects there; he’ll have to either find someone in the system to advocate his position or go straight to the top of the food chain with his requests.
Getting anything done through government channels can be extremely difficult and time consuming in Yemen. For the past three decades, political power in Yemen has been tightly controlled by President Saleh. In order to maintain its grip over the country, the Saleh regime buys loyalty and alliances, funded entirely by oil revenues. These alliances —include a wide range of interest groups such as tribes, security services, political parties, and religious groups. The President must keep these interest groups satisfied in order to maintain stability and his rule. President Saleh’s sons are active in the small inner circle of decision-making and politics, but it is unclear who will have the political acumen to balance the system after President Saleh.
Corruption is widespread, and government institutions are extremely weak, especially outside of the capital city. There is little transparency or accountability, and government officials and judges aren’t always qualified and can be easily bribed. In order to maintain control for himself and his tribe, the Saleh regime has tried to deny power to local governments in the south. Regional governors, appointed by Saleh, are all northerners from tribes allied with the President Sanhan tribe. Tribes and the military-security apparatus receive the most benefit from Yemen’s elaborate patronage network. Tribes receive money directly from the government, which is included in the national budget. On top of that, the government’s Department of Tribal grants significant sheikhs (some 4,000-5,000 in total) a monthly salary as well as semiofficial status as legal officers. Northern tribes have benefitted most from this system.
Once the tribal leaders receive the payments it is at their discretion to distribute cash among their tribesman and family members, which is based on internal tribal hierarchies and family connections. Military elites also benefit from the patronage system. The government allocates budgets to important military officials based on the number of soldiers under their command. So the officers tend to be liberal when reporting numbers of men with the use of “ghost soldiers,” who can be entirely fictitious or actual people who just don’t report for duty.
A second form of patronage payoffs to military elites is through the Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO). Run by active duty military officers, YECO controls large pieces of land, primarily in the old South Yemen, and is prone to corruption. It is not uncommon for the military, either directly or through YECO, to claim occupied land for military use and then sell it to developers for private gain.
The government patronage network spreads throughout the government bureaucracy and “employs” thousands of Yemenis civil servants, many of whom collect salaries without performing any duties. The government also buys friends in Yemen’s business families. Support and loyalty is often rewarded with lucrative business contracts. Moreover, Yemeni society is marked by the absence of a strong middle class, which then makes the tribes “the dominant power brokers in Yemen because they’re the ones with the money. They directly challenge the state for authority and compete with it for the loyalty of the public at the local level.
According to the UNDP office in Yemen, 15.7 percent of the population lives on less than US$1 a day and 45.2 percent live on less than US$2 a day. Which is why it doesn’t take much to pay people off. It is clear that the majority of the wealth that the government distributes is funneled directly into this patronage network. This means that power is concentrated at the center.
This concludes Part 1 of our guide to Yemen. You're welcome in advance, Murray.
Yemeni society is characterized by an intoxicating blend of fragmented loyalties, tension between governmental and tribal authorities, and various inconsistent mechanisms for dispute resolution; it's salted and peppered with bribery and patronage, marinated in seven mouthwatering herbs and spices, and then deep-fried.
In this first installment of advice, I'll address how Murray will inevitably have to secure government cooperation for his various projects there; he’ll have to either find someone in the system to advocate his position or go straight to the top of the food chain with his requests.
Getting anything done through government channels can be extremely difficult and time consuming in Yemen. For the past three decades, political power in Yemen has been tightly controlled by President Saleh. In order to maintain its grip over the country, the Saleh regime buys loyalty and alliances, funded entirely by oil revenues. These alliances —include a wide range of interest groups such as tribes, security services, political parties, and religious groups. The President must keep these interest groups satisfied in order to maintain stability and his rule. President Saleh’s sons are active in the small inner circle of decision-making and politics, but it is unclear who will have the political acumen to balance the system after President Saleh.
Corruption is widespread, and government institutions are extremely weak, especially outside of the capital city. There is little transparency or accountability, and government officials and judges aren’t always qualified and can be easily bribed. In order to maintain control for himself and his tribe, the Saleh regime has tried to deny power to local governments in the south. Regional governors, appointed by Saleh, are all northerners from tribes allied with the President Sanhan tribe. Tribes and the military-security apparatus receive the most benefit from Yemen’s elaborate patronage network. Tribes receive money directly from the government, which is included in the national budget. On top of that, the government’s Department of Tribal grants significant sheikhs (some 4,000-5,000 in total) a monthly salary as well as semiofficial status as legal officers. Northern tribes have benefitted most from this system.
Once the tribal leaders receive the payments it is at their discretion to distribute cash among their tribesman and family members, which is based on internal tribal hierarchies and family connections. Military elites also benefit from the patronage system. The government allocates budgets to important military officials based on the number of soldiers under their command. So the officers tend to be liberal when reporting numbers of men with the use of “ghost soldiers,” who can be entirely fictitious or actual people who just don’t report for duty.
A second form of patronage payoffs to military elites is through the Yemen Economic Corporation (YECO). Run by active duty military officers, YECO controls large pieces of land, primarily in the old South Yemen, and is prone to corruption. It is not uncommon for the military, either directly or through YECO, to claim occupied land for military use and then sell it to developers for private gain.
The government patronage network spreads throughout the government bureaucracy and “employs” thousands of Yemenis civil servants, many of whom collect salaries without performing any duties. The government also buys friends in Yemen’s business families. Support and loyalty is often rewarded with lucrative business contracts. Moreover, Yemeni society is marked by the absence of a strong middle class, which then makes the tribes “the dominant power brokers in Yemen because they’re the ones with the money. They directly challenge the state for authority and compete with it for the loyalty of the public at the local level.
According to the UNDP office in Yemen, 15.7 percent of the population lives on less than US$1 a day and 45.2 percent live on less than US$2 a day. Which is why it doesn’t take much to pay people off. It is clear that the majority of the wealth that the government distributes is funneled directly into this patronage network. This means that power is concentrated at the center.
This concludes Part 1 of our guide to Yemen. You're welcome in advance, Murray.
Sunday, May 31, 2009
Help is on the Way
While the self-help movement has traditionally been characterized as a uniquely American phenomenon—an $11 billion industry in 2008—it is also burgeoning in the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia, self-help books like Men Are From Mars, Women are From Venus are bestsellers; the Farsi translation of The Secret, a renowned (and Oprah-endorsed) book about the power of optimism, is in its 10th printing in Iran, and independent self-help magazines such as Iran’s Happiness Magazine dot the shelves of bookstores and newsstands throughout the country.
Oprah Winfrey has a huge following, showing twice a day on pan-Arab television. Yet a surprising entry into the self-help field is Muslim clerics, who are increasingly assuming the roles of charismatic self-help gurus. Increasingly, they are generating bestselling books and popular television shows that embed the notions of success and self-improvement within a framework of Islamic values. In Stop Worrying, Relax and Be Happy, Egyptian Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali directly cites Dale Carnegie’s 1936 classic How to Stop Worrying and Start Living. Adopting Carnegie’s metaphor of a flexible twig that resists snapping in the wind, Al-Ghazali encourages Muslims to bow to Allah’s will so as to avoid “snapping” in difficult times. Saudi Sheikh Aaidh al-Qarni has become another “motivational sheikh.” In 2007, he claimed his book Don’t be Sad sold two million copies, but bloggers complain it is merely an Islamicized version of Carnegie’s message. As this ethic of personal growth and self-improvement continues to spread, it’s hard to imagine how the desire to “win friends and influence people” could ever be uniquely American.
Oprah Winfrey has a huge following, showing twice a day on pan-Arab television. Yet a surprising entry into the self-help field is Muslim clerics, who are increasingly assuming the roles of charismatic self-help gurus. Increasingly, they are generating bestselling books and popular television shows that embed the notions of success and self-improvement within a framework of Islamic values. In Stop Worrying, Relax and Be Happy, Egyptian Sheikh Muhammad al-Ghazali directly cites Dale Carnegie’s 1936 classic How to Stop Worrying and Start Living. Adopting Carnegie’s metaphor of a flexible twig that resists snapping in the wind, Al-Ghazali encourages Muslims to bow to Allah’s will so as to avoid “snapping” in difficult times. Saudi Sheikh Aaidh al-Qarni has become another “motivational sheikh.” In 2007, he claimed his book Don’t be Sad sold two million copies, but bloggers complain it is merely an Islamicized version of Carnegie’s message. As this ethic of personal growth and self-improvement continues to spread, it’s hard to imagine how the desire to “win friends and influence people” could ever be uniquely American.
Monday, May 11, 2009
What do the Arab-Israeli Peace Process and the Produce Section Have in Common?
Okay, I must warn you, O imaginary readership, for this may be my most "mohem" post yet... so bear with me. Earlier today, I attended a panel discussion at the Woodrow Wilson Center entitled, “Breakthrough or Breakdown: The Obama Administration and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process,” and I was vaguely uplifted by the panelists’ views on the Arab-Israeli peace initiative. According to Aaron David Miller, a public policy scholar at the Wilson Center, “there is nothing wrong with a bold and ambitions agenda,” when it comes to Arab-Israeli peace; what is wrong, however, is the attempt to mobilize this agenda with illusions about the conditions and costs of a fair, lasting agreement. Optimistic about the prospects of peace and the United States’ ability to foster such an agreement, Miller invited Ghaith Al-Omari and Shai Feldman to discuss the political concerns and objectives that Abbas and Netanyahu will bring to the table during their upcoming visits to Washington—both of which, he argued, could potentially mark either a “breakthrough or a breakdown” in the Arab-Israeli peace process.
All three panelists agreed that the domestic conditions for an Palestinian-Israeli agreement are not yet ripe, as each political entity must achieve a certain degree of consensus among their respective leaders before a two-state solution could come to fruition. Ghaith Al-Omari, Advocacy Director of the American Task Force on Palestine and former adviser to President Mahmoud Abbas, discussed several obstacles that the Palestinians face on the domestic front-- mainly the discord between Fatah and Hamas, Fatah’s mistrust of Salam Fayyad in his efforts to create a nonpartisan security apparatus, and internal fragmentation within the Fatah party itself. While the prospects of a unity government are grim, Al-Omari was confident that a consensus would be possible if the Palestinian Authority could disassociate itself with discredited members of the PLO, while being careful not to legitimize Hamas by holding negotiations without preconditions.
Similarly, Shai Feldman—Judith and Sidney Swartz Director at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University—discussed the varying views on the Israeli side, highlighting the different approaches of Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minister Lieberman. In the absence of a Palestinian unity, Netanyahu favors a “bottom-up” approach of lifting barriers to ease the flow of people and economic activity; meanwhile, Lieberman supports a two-state solution, and Barak is willing to engage with Gaza in order to remove blockades and put an end to rocket attacks. Feldman argued that the eventual amalgamation of agendas would by no means yield a major Sadat-style breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli process. Rather, the window has been opened slightly, and just enough for the process to accelerate in a meaningful direction.
While both Al-Omari and Feldman were concerned with the particular domestic conditions that affect the Palestinian-Israeli issue, they went on to treat the issue within the larger context of the Israeli-Arab peace process. While various issues regarding Syria, Israel, Iran, and Palestine must be treated in strategic conjunction with one another, argued Miller, Israel could only begin to break out of its regional isolation if it dealt with the Palestinian issue first.
Feldman stressed the need for an operationalized Arab-Israeli peace initiative that includes clear benchmarks and incentives for Israeli compliance with the braided issues of Palestine, Syria, and Iran. Yet, fully acknowledging the limitations of U.S. incentives alone, both Feldman and Al-Omari envisioned different triggers for this comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement: Feldman argued that Arab leaders must rise to the challenge of setting these concrete goals and agree to create material incentives for Israeli cooperation; Al-Omari argued that a system of goals and rewards among Israel and the Arab nations could only emerge if the quality of life in Gaza improves and if the U.S. Congress and the Jewish mainstream undergo a significant shift in their discourse.
Echoing this imperative to materialize the incentives for cooperation, Miller stressed the importance of abandoning any illusions about the costs of the peace process. Rather than trying to reach an agreement "on the cheap," Arab and Israeli leaders must be honest about how much time, patience, and sacrifice a meaningful agreement will require; in turn, the U.S. must be honest about the implications of its “special” relationship with Israel, as America cannot be a credible and effective mediator if this exclusivity continues.
With his confidence in diplomacy and resolute departure from the previous administration’s approach, Barack Obama has infused the Arab-Israeli peace process with an ethic of hope. Miller suggests three possible scenarios that the U.S. could pursue: first, the “cautious approach,” in which the U.S. assumes that Israel will take no steps towards peace until the U.S. deals with Iran; the “smart approach,” which prioritizes the ostensibly more attainable Israeli-Syrian agreement over the seemingly unsolvable Israeli-Palestinian issue; and the “bold approach,” which locates the U.S. at the crux of the peace process as well as the fate of Jerusalem, borders, refugees, security, and the role of Arab neighbors in fostering a comprehensive agreement.
What I found especially interesting about this two-hour discussion was the frequency with which each panelist employed produce-related analogies to describe the Arab-Israeli peace initiative: Each speaker believed that the domestic conditions in Israel and Palestine were not yet ripe for a fair and enduring agreement; the “low-hanging fruit” in Israeli foreign policy is dealing with Syria and the Golan Heights first, rather than tackling the Palestinian issue; Feldman described Lieberman, Barak, and Netanyahu as three different "fruits" in the blender of policymaking that just may, before talks with the US commence, create a "smoothie" of consensus (this actually got a lot of laughs from the audience).
I feel like this fruit/ agricultural rhetoric is intimately tied to the sense of urgency with which an Arab-Israeli agreement is always posited (and appropriately so)—"the time is ripe;" the talks are premature; the process is in a state of decay. While the Obama administration has forged a new window of opportunity with the issue (especially in the aftermath of Gaza), the clock has by no means stopped entirely. The US must act quickly to ensure commitment on both sides, paying close attention to the “degrees of ripeness” that circumscribe the process itself... lest the prospect of peace become the stuff of political compost (too far?).
In short, if we’re going to cultivate a meaningful and lasting Arab-Israeli agreement under the leadership of the new administration, the domestic scene must be ripe, Arab and Israeli leaders must be honest and committed, clear benchmarks must be established...and everyone is going to have to grow a pair of grapes.
All three panelists agreed that the domestic conditions for an Palestinian-Israeli agreement are not yet ripe, as each political entity must achieve a certain degree of consensus among their respective leaders before a two-state solution could come to fruition. Ghaith Al-Omari, Advocacy Director of the American Task Force on Palestine and former adviser to President Mahmoud Abbas, discussed several obstacles that the Palestinians face on the domestic front-- mainly the discord between Fatah and Hamas, Fatah’s mistrust of Salam Fayyad in his efforts to create a nonpartisan security apparatus, and internal fragmentation within the Fatah party itself. While the prospects of a unity government are grim, Al-Omari was confident that a consensus would be possible if the Palestinian Authority could disassociate itself with discredited members of the PLO, while being careful not to legitimize Hamas by holding negotiations without preconditions.
Similarly, Shai Feldman—Judith and Sidney Swartz Director at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University—discussed the varying views on the Israeli side, highlighting the different approaches of Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Barak, and Foreign Minister Lieberman. In the absence of a Palestinian unity, Netanyahu favors a “bottom-up” approach of lifting barriers to ease the flow of people and economic activity; meanwhile, Lieberman supports a two-state solution, and Barak is willing to engage with Gaza in order to remove blockades and put an end to rocket attacks. Feldman argued that the eventual amalgamation of agendas would by no means yield a major Sadat-style breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli process. Rather, the window has been opened slightly, and just enough for the process to accelerate in a meaningful direction.
While both Al-Omari and Feldman were concerned with the particular domestic conditions that affect the Palestinian-Israeli issue, they went on to treat the issue within the larger context of the Israeli-Arab peace process. While various issues regarding Syria, Israel, Iran, and Palestine must be treated in strategic conjunction with one another, argued Miller, Israel could only begin to break out of its regional isolation if it dealt with the Palestinian issue first.
Feldman stressed the need for an operationalized Arab-Israeli peace initiative that includes clear benchmarks and incentives for Israeli compliance with the braided issues of Palestine, Syria, and Iran. Yet, fully acknowledging the limitations of U.S. incentives alone, both Feldman and Al-Omari envisioned different triggers for this comprehensive Arab-Israeli agreement: Feldman argued that Arab leaders must rise to the challenge of setting these concrete goals and agree to create material incentives for Israeli cooperation; Al-Omari argued that a system of goals and rewards among Israel and the Arab nations could only emerge if the quality of life in Gaza improves and if the U.S. Congress and the Jewish mainstream undergo a significant shift in their discourse.
Echoing this imperative to materialize the incentives for cooperation, Miller stressed the importance of abandoning any illusions about the costs of the peace process. Rather than trying to reach an agreement "on the cheap," Arab and Israeli leaders must be honest about how much time, patience, and sacrifice a meaningful agreement will require; in turn, the U.S. must be honest about the implications of its “special” relationship with Israel, as America cannot be a credible and effective mediator if this exclusivity continues.
With his confidence in diplomacy and resolute departure from the previous administration’s approach, Barack Obama has infused the Arab-Israeli peace process with an ethic of hope. Miller suggests three possible scenarios that the U.S. could pursue: first, the “cautious approach,” in which the U.S. assumes that Israel will take no steps towards peace until the U.S. deals with Iran; the “smart approach,” which prioritizes the ostensibly more attainable Israeli-Syrian agreement over the seemingly unsolvable Israeli-Palestinian issue; and the “bold approach,” which locates the U.S. at the crux of the peace process as well as the fate of Jerusalem, borders, refugees, security, and the role of Arab neighbors in fostering a comprehensive agreement.
What I found especially interesting about this two-hour discussion was the frequency with which each panelist employed produce-related analogies to describe the Arab-Israeli peace initiative: Each speaker believed that the domestic conditions in Israel and Palestine were not yet ripe for a fair and enduring agreement; the “low-hanging fruit” in Israeli foreign policy is dealing with Syria and the Golan Heights first, rather than tackling the Palestinian issue; Feldman described Lieberman, Barak, and Netanyahu as three different "fruits" in the blender of policymaking that just may, before talks with the US commence, create a "smoothie" of consensus (this actually got a lot of laughs from the audience).
I feel like this fruit/ agricultural rhetoric is intimately tied to the sense of urgency with which an Arab-Israeli agreement is always posited (and appropriately so)—"the time is ripe;" the talks are premature; the process is in a state of decay. While the Obama administration has forged a new window of opportunity with the issue (especially in the aftermath of Gaza), the clock has by no means stopped entirely. The US must act quickly to ensure commitment on both sides, paying close attention to the “degrees of ripeness” that circumscribe the process itself... lest the prospect of peace become the stuff of political compost (too far?).
In short, if we’re going to cultivate a meaningful and lasting Arab-Israeli agreement under the leadership of the new administration, the domestic scene must be ripe, Arab and Israeli leaders must be honest and committed, clear benchmarks must be established...and everyone is going to have to grow a pair of grapes.
Monday, May 4, 2009
East Meets Worst.
Okay. I am not going to belabor the issue, but this post is long overdue. I’ve recently had a number of conversations about the same topic (albeit in varied forms), and it seems that annoying typeface is a ghost with many minions whose haunting presence stalks even the best of us. And while the traditional players in this face-off of frustrating fonts—Comic Sans, Curlz, and Lucida (in her many varieties)—never fail to rear their ugly heads, I feel that one perpetrator in particular always manages to scrape by unmentioned: Papyrus. Man. Even typing it in Times gives me the chills.
For the record, that Papyrus is a terrible, hack-y font is no original observation; there are myriads of websites dedicated to denouncing the typeface and its vapid overuse. (My personal faves are the oh-so-ironic I [heart] Papyrus and Papyrus Watch.) But here, I am concerned with a larger problem…
I have always tried to articulate what, exactly, is wrong with Papyrus, but I’ve usually just settled for my friend Hussam’s beautifully understated description: “hella Orientalist.” It’s not so much the reference to Egypt per se that annoys me, but how ubiquitous Papyrus is when concerning issues of the Middle East. I cringe wherever I see this font employed as a reference to the East-- flyers advertising a campus exhibit of “Eastern art,” coupons to the new falafel place that just opened up around the corner, a new Egyptian Musk-scented oil by Glade! Yes, I get it. Egypt. Papyrus: So old! It was the first paper. Let’s let it represent all that is ancient, weathered, and borderline irrelevant. You’re abusive and trite. Get out of here, you tattered, tired typeface.
Wicked!
I was intrigued (shocked to the core even) to learn that the designer of this typefa(r)ce, Chris Costello, created Papyrus in 1982 with ancient Egypt in mind. His website even includes a little preview of how one might utilize his brilliant creation. So… basically, unless you’re doing a Powerpoint presentation on Akhnaton for your 5th grade Social Studies class (as Costello’s earth-shattering production seems to suggest), please steer clear, and don’t use this font for anything vaguely Eastern. Just…Please. For me.
Find some other way to convey that whatever you will discuss/ sell/ exhibit is old or mysterious or exotic or Eastern... Circle the “E” on a picture of a cracked and rusty compass, whatever. Just no more Papyrus.
For the record, that Papyrus is a terrible, hack-y font is no original observation; there are myriads of websites dedicated to denouncing the typeface and its vapid overuse. (My personal faves are the oh-so-ironic I [heart] Papyrus and Papyrus Watch.) But here, I am concerned with a larger problem…
I have always tried to articulate what, exactly, is wrong with Papyrus, but I’ve usually just settled for my friend Hussam’s beautifully understated description: “hella Orientalist.” It’s not so much the reference to Egypt per se that annoys me, but how ubiquitous Papyrus is when concerning issues of the Middle East. I cringe wherever I see this font employed as a reference to the East-- flyers advertising a campus exhibit of “Eastern art,” coupons to the new falafel place that just opened up around the corner, a new Egyptian Musk-scented oil by Glade! Yes, I get it. Egypt. Papyrus: So old! It was the first paper. Let’s let it represent all that is ancient, weathered, and borderline irrelevant. You’re abusive and trite. Get out of here, you tattered, tired typeface.
Wicked! I was intrigued (shocked to the core even) to learn that the designer of this typefa(r)ce, Chris Costello, created Papyrus in 1982 with ancient Egypt in mind. His website even includes a little preview of how one might utilize his brilliant creation. So… basically, unless you’re doing a Powerpoint presentation on Akhnaton for your 5th grade Social Studies class (as Costello’s earth-shattering production seems to suggest), please steer clear, and don’t use this font for anything vaguely Eastern. Just…Please. For me.
Find some other way to convey that whatever you will discuss/ sell/ exhibit is old or mysterious or exotic or Eastern... Circle the “E” on a picture of a cracked and rusty compass, whatever. Just no more Papyrus.
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